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Abstract
In everyday life, involuntary thoughts about future plans and events occur as often as involuntary thoughts about the past. 
However, compared to involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs), such episodic involuntary future thoughts (IFTs) 
have become a focus of study only recently. The aim of the present investigation was to examine why we are not constantly 
flooded by IFTs and IAMs given that they are often triggered by incidental cues while performing undemanding activi-
ties. One possibility is that activated thoughts are suppressed by the inhibitory control mechanism, and therefore depleting 
inhibitory control should enhance the frequency of both IFTs and IAMs. We report an experiment with a between-subjects 
design, in which participants in the depleted inhibition condition performed a 60-min high-conflict Stroop task before 
completing a laboratory vigilance task measuring the frequency of IFTs and IAMs. Participants in the intact inhibition 
condition performed a version of the Stroop task that did not deplete inhibitory control. To control for physical and mental 
fatigue resulting from performing the 60-min Stroop tasks in experimental conditions, participants in the control condition 
completed only the vigilance task. Contrary to predictions, the number of IFTs and IAMs reported during the vigilance task, 
using the probe-caught method, did not differ across conditions. However, manipulation checks showed that participants’ 
inhibitory resources were reduced in the depleted inhibition condition, and participants were more tired in the experimental 
than in the control conditions. These initial findings suggest that neither inhibitory control nor physical and mental fatigue 
affect the frequency of IFTs and IAMs.
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Introduction
Every time we project ourselves back in time to re-expe-
rience personal past, or forward in time to think about 
possible future events, we engage in episodic mental time 
travel (MTT; Suddendorf, Addis, & Corballis, 2009). Past 
research has focused predominantly on deliberate forms of 
MTT (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; D’Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004). For example, when trying to recall 
the last time we ate pizza or planning our next summer holi-
day, we are engaged in voluntary MTT. It involves strategic 
and constructive retrieval or simulation of events from our 
episodic memory. According to the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis, thinking about the future may be even 
more effortful than recalling the past, because it involves 
a flexible re-combination of available episodic information 
into a novel event (Schacter and Addis 2007).
However, in everyday life, such episodic past or future-
oriented thoughts may also come to mind unexpectedly 
without trying to think about them (e.g., Berntsen & Jacob-
sen, 2008). While involuntary thoughts about the past (i.e., 
involuntary autobiographical memories, IAMs) have been 
investigated extensively over the past decade, research on 
their prospective counterpart (i.e., episodic involuntary 
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future thoughts, IFTs), is in its infancy with only a handful 
of published studies (for a review, see Berntsen 2018, this 
volume).
In line with research on voluntary forms of MTT, ini-
tial studies comparing involuntary episodic past and future 
thinking have revealed interesting similarities between the 
two. For example, the diary studies by Berntsen & Jacobsen 
(2008) and Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen (2013) showed that 
in everyday life, IFTs occur as frequently as IAMs, sug-
gesting that involuntary occurrence of such thoughts could 
be the basic mode in which our cognitive system prefers to 
operate in daily life (cf. Berntsen, 2010). Similar to IAMs, 
IFTs are more likely to occur when an individual is engaged 
in an automatic activity with low attention demands, and in 
response to incidental external and internal cues that usu-
ally overlap with key features of the IFT content (e.g., when 
seeing a manuscript on a desk, imagining how relieved one 
would be to get it published one day) (Berntsen and Jacob-
sen, 2008; Finnbogadóttir and Berntsen, 2013).
More recently, researchers have started to investigate IFTs 
with a laboratory method, which was developed initially by 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili (2008) to study IAMs. In these 
studies (Cole, Staugaard, & Berntsen, 2016; Plimpton, Patel, 
& Kvavilashvili, 2015; Vannucci, Pelagatti, & Marchetti, 
2017), participants reported IFTs and IAMs that occurred 
during a vigilance task that required little attention (detect-
ing infrequent target vertical lines in a stream of slides with 
horizontal lines). In addition, participants were exposed to 
brief (and irrelevant) verbal phrases on the screen, some 
of which might incidentally trigger IFTs. These studies 
have resulted in several additional findings demonstrating 
important similarities between involuntary thoughts about 
the past and future. For example, like IAMs, IFTs were 
often reported to occur in response to irrelevant word cues 
on the screen. They were also as specific and reported as 
quickly in response to word cues as IAMs (Cole, Staugaard, 
& Berntsen, 2016), suggesting that IFTs may rely on a simi-
lar automatic spreading activation mechanism, even though 
they involve imagining events that have not yet happened. 
Therefore, similar to IAMs, IFTs may require little effort and 
constructive processes. However, some differences between 
IAMs and IFTs were also reported. For example, more IAMs 
than IFTs were reported in the standard vigilance task with 
verbal cues (Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton et al., 2015; Van-
nucci et al., 2017), while this pattern was reversed in the 
vigilance task with no verbal cues (Vannucci et al., 2017), 
suggesting that in the absence of meaningful (verbal) stim-
uli, participants were more likely to spontaneously think 
about the future than the past.
This finding is particularly interesting in light of the pro-
spective bias in task-unrelated thoughts, reported in mind-
wandering research (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; 
Stawarczyk, 2018), which has used similar vigilance and 
go/no-go tasks, but often without any irrelevant verbal cues 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). It raises an interesting 
possibility that IFTs and IAMs may constitute the content of 
at least some of the task-unrelated thoughts studied in mind-
wandering research (for similar views see Johannessen & 
Berntsen, 2010; Plimpton et al., 2015), and emphasises the 
importance of cross-talk between currently separate areas of 
research on mind-wandering and involuntary episodic past 
and future thinking.
Role of cognitive inhibition in experiencing 
involuntary mental time travel
Although there is widespread agreement that IFTs and IAMs 
come to mind automatically, very little is known about their 
underlying cognitive mechanisms in terms of cognitive pro-
cesses that enable the experience of such thoughts when one 
is engaged in unrelated activities (Berntsen, 2009, p. 86). 
The issue of why we involuntarily project ourselves back 
or forward in time pertains to a broader question about why 
are we not constantly flooded by these thoughts in daily 
life, given that both IFTs and IAMs are triggered automati-
cally in response to incidental external and internal cues 
(Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, & Paccani 
2015). It is intriguing to ask what keeps these spontaneous 
mental occurrences at bay and enables us to carry on with 
our daily activities uninterrupted. The present paper aimed 
to verify one possible answer to this question, namely, that 
cognitive inhibition may preclude the occurrence of IFTs 
and IAMs when people are engaged in other activities. If 
there is indeed a special inhibitory mechanism that keeps 
spontaneously occurring past and future thoughts at bay, 
then they should be reported more frequently in conditions 
where this inhibitory mechanism is impaired compared to 
conditions when inhibitory control works optimally. In the 
present paper, we call this approach the cognitive inhibition 
dependency view, which is based on the model of autobio-
graphical memory proposed by Conway et al.
According to the self-memory system model proposed by 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000, for later modifications see 
Conway, 2008, 2009; Conway & Jobson, 2012), autobiograph-
ical memory consists of a hierarchical network of intercon-
nected nodes that differ in terms of their level of specificity. 
At the bottom of the network are stored fragments of events 
with specific sensory details (e.g., details experienced when 
riding a horse for the first time). Such vivid information is fur-
ther connected to super-ordinate levels of general events (e.g., 
riding a horse on Sundays), common themes (riding, doing 
sports), or even, at the highest level of memory nodes, impor-
tant periods in one’s life (e.g., when I was still young and fit). 
According to this model, the activation of autobiographical 
information may spread across the network resulting in the 
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construction of a particular memory. Importantly, such activa-
tion may be elicited by different types of cues (i.e., internal 
or external). While voluntary autobiographical memories are 
the result of a top-down search process that eventually arrives 
at an episode, directly retrieved (i.e., involuntary) memories 
are thought to circumvent the search process and arrive at 
the episode and enter consciousness very quickly. As Con-
way & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) argued, fragments of memory 
representations are constantly activated at the bottom level of 
the hierarchy by different internal and external cues, but the 
vast majority of such memories never reach consciousness 
due to being suppressed by the constantly operating executive 
control system. Only some of these activated memories, espe-
cially those that are consistent with current self-goals, may 
occasionally get through this inhibitory control mechanism 
and reach awareness. This implies that IAMs can occur as 
a result of two concurrent processes, namely spreading acti-
vation (i.e., boosting the chances of memory retrieval) and 
inhibition processes that, in fact, may work against each other 
(see Ball & Hennessey, 2009). In this sense, the retrieval of 
IAMs would depend mainly on inefficient functioning of the 
inhibitory control mechanism.
Although Conway et al.’s model concerns the retrieval 
of autobiographical memories, it may also have interesting 
implications for the occurrence of IFTs in daily life. For 
example, there is growing evidence to show that involuntary 
and voluntary future thoughts are often goal-oriented, which 
has resulted in the use of a new term ‘autobiographical plan-
ning’ in the literature (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2011; Spreng, Gerlach, Turner, & Schacter, 2015). A recent 
study by Cole & Berntsen (2016) showed that IFTs were 
more likely to reflect people’s current concerns and goals 
than memories about the past (see also Anderson & McDan-
iel, 2018; Plimpton et al., 2015). Therefore, the occurrence 
of IFTs could be even more dependent on the malfunctioning 
of the inhibitory control mechanism specified by the self-
memory system than the retrieval of IAMs.
However, the occurrence of IFTs and IAMs may also be 
explained within a broader framework of inhibitory control 
proposed by Hasher and colleagues (see Hasher, Lustig, & 
Zacks, 2007, 1999). According to Hasher et al. (1999), inhi-
bition serves at least two important, but different functions: 
(1) suppression of automatic responses, and (2) suppression 
of interference from irrelevant information (see also Fried-
man & Miyake, 2004). While deficits in the former may 
result in impulsive behaviour (Nigg, 2000), deficits in the 
latter may result in experiencing involuntary mental contents 
such as memories and future thoughts in response to irrel-
evant stimuli or distracters in one’s environment (Dempster, 
1992). Therefore, according to this view, depletion of inhibi-
tory control resources would increase individual’s suscep-
tibility to irrelevant stimuli in general and would result in 
increased likelihood of experiencing both IFTs and IAMs.
So far, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no previ-
ous study has directly investigated the role of cognitive 
inhibition in the frequency of experiencing IFTs and IAMs 
by manipulating the levels of inhibitory control in partici-
pants. However, a couple of studies have used correlational 
methods to address this issue. For example, Kamiya (2014) 
reported a significant positive correlation (r (22) = 0.60, 
p < 0.01) between the number of IAMs reported during a 
walk around campus and the scores on the Cognitive Fail-
ures Questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald 
and Parkes, 1982). The CFQ measures the frequency of 
minor absent-minded slips and errors in everyday life in the 
cognitive domains of perception, memory and action, which 
may reflect indirectly the weak functioning of the inhibitory 
processes (Friedman and Miyake, 2004). In addition, several 
studies on individuals with attentional deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), which is characterized by low levels of 
inhibitory control, have demonstrated that they have elevated 
levels of spontaneous mind-wandering (e.g., Seli, Small-
wood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015; see also; Jonkman, Markus, 
Franklin, & Van Dalfsen, 2017; Shaw & Giambra, 1993).
The present investigation
According to the two influential theoretical models of Con-
way & Pleydell-Pearce (2001) and Hasher et al. (1999), the 
occurrence of IFTs and IAMs may depend on the intact 
inhibitory control mechanism that prevents our stream 
of consciousness from being flooded by task-unrelated 
thoughts about the past and future. The main aim of the 
present investigation was to test this assumption by experi-
mentally depleting the inhibitory resources of participants 
by engaging them in cognitive tasks that require high levels 
of inhibitory control. We based this manipulation on the 
idea that inhibition relies on limited resources that cannot 
be continuously maintained for a long time and thus are 
easily depleted (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel, 
2007). For example, participants in a recent study by Radel, 
Davranche, Fournier, & Dietrich (2015) performed a high 
conflict task (the Simon task1 in Study 1a and 2, and the 
1 In this task (Simon, 1969), participants have to decide between a 
left- and right-hand key presses according to the colour of a visual 
stimulus. This target is presented either to the left or to the right of 
a central fixation point. In the congruent trial, required response cor-
responds spatially to the stimulus location. In the incongruent trial, 
required response does not correspond (the location is irrelevant). 
Therefore, the “Simon effect” occurs when the location automatically 
triggers a response impulse while the relevant colour needs to be con-
verted into the required response in accordance to the given instruc-
tion (Suarez et  al., 2015). While in congruent stimulus–response 
associations, both the irrelevant location and the colour activate the 
required response, in incongruent associations the irrelevant location 
triggers the wrong response.
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Eriksen Flanker task2 in Study 1b) for 40 min in which 50% 
of trials were incongruent trials. In such conflict tasks, par-
ticipants can accurately respond to a target stimulus only by 
selecting its relevant feature and by inhibiting the irrelevant 
feature that automatically triggers the incorrect response. 
While in the congruent trials, both the irrelevant informa-
tion (e.g., the flankers) and the relevant information (e.g., 
the centre target arrow) are mapped to the same responses 
(e.g., are pointing in the same direction), in the incongru-
ent trials they are associated with different responses. As a 
result, reaction times and performance accuracy are usually 
reported to be better for congruent than for incongruent tri-
als. This interference effect (measured by subtracting reac-
tion times of incongruent and congruent trials) is considered 
as a reliable indicator of the cognitive control efficacy (e.g., 
Van Den Wildenberg, Wylie, Forstmann, Burle, Hasbroucq, 
& Ridderinkhof, 2010). Radel et al. (2015) showed that only 
participants engaged in the high interference version of a 
conflict task had impaired cognitive resources for inhibition, 
providing strong support to the idea that inhibitory resources 
are indeed limited and can be easily depleted by a simple 
experimental manipulation (see also, Schmeichel, 2007).
In the present study, to test the cognitive inhibition 
dependency hypothesis, we depleted the cognitive control 
prior to measuring the frequency of IFTs and IAMs in the 
standard vigilance task (e.g., Plimpton et al., 2015). More 
specifically, we engaged participants in the prolonged prac-
tice of a cognitive task that differed in the amount of inhibi-
tory control required. We used a well-known Stroop conflict 
task (Stroop, 1935; Kane & Eagle, 2003) where participants 
have to react as fast as possible in response to the colour 
of the ink (e.g., red) of a given word (e.g., ‘blue’) while 
ignoring its meaning (‘blue’). The main differences between 
the current procedure and the Radel et al.’s (2015) original 
manipulation were as follows: (1) use of the Stroop task to 
deplete inhibition, (2) extending the manipulation from 40 
to 60 min, (3) increasing the number of incongruent trials 
in the depleted inhibition condition from 50 to 75%. In the 
intact depletion condition, participants named the colour of 
the ink, which was identical to the meaning of the word 
(e.g., word ‘red’ printed in red ink) for 60 min. Importantly, 
we controlled the level of tiredness and fatigue in these two 
experimental conditions by having the control group of 
participants who were not engaged in the Stroop task before 
the vigilance task.
To measure the frequency of IFTs and IAMs under well-
controlled laboratory conditions, participants were engaged 
in a vigilance task in which they had to detect infrequent tar-
get slides with vertical lines and ignore the non-target slides 
with patterns of horizontal lines (see Plimpton et al., 2015). 
In addition, they were exposed to short verbal phrases, some 
of which could incidentally trigger task-unrelated thoughts, 
including IFTs and IAMs. Throughout the vigilance task, 
participants were probed at random intervals to record their 
thoughts at the moment they were stopped. Finally, on com-
pletion of the task, participants were given their thought 
descriptions and were asked to indicate whether they were 
memories or future thoughts.
According to the cognitive inhibition dependency view, 
the frequency of IFTs and IAMs should be influenced by the 
level of available inhibitory resources. Thus, we expected to 
observe higher frequencies of IFTs and IAMs when inhibi-
tory resources were depleted, namely, after performing the 
incongruent Stroop task compared to when these resources 
were not depleted (i.e., after performing the congruent 
Stroop task). Given that IFTs seem to be more consistent 
with one’s current goals and concerns than IAMs (Cole & 
Berntsen, 2016), it is also possible to observe more IFTs 
than IAMs in the depleted inhibition condition compared to 
the intact inhibition and control conditions. Alternatively, if 
such involuntary cognitions are not dependent on the levels 
of available inhibitory control, the experimental and control 
conditions should not differ in the frequency of IFTs and 
IAMs.
Method
Design
A mixed subjects design was employed in the present study. 
The between-subjects variable was the levels of available 
cognitive inhibitory resources just before the vigilance task 
(depleted inhibition, intact inhibition, control group), and the 
within-subjects variable was the type of involuntary thought 
reported during the vigilance task (IFTs, IAMs).
Participants
The Research Ethics Committee approved the Study. Written 
consent for participation was obtained prior to data collec-
tion. Importantly, during the recruitment process, all par-
ticipants were clearly informed that the laboratory session 
was very demanding and involved performing attentionally 
demanding tasks for prolonged periods of time. They were 
2 In this task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), participants have to press 
the arrow keys with either the left or right index finger according to 
the direction pointed by the centre target arrow. This target arrow is 
surrounded by other arrows (flankers) that are to be ignored. In con-
gruent trials all targets, including flankers, indicate the same response 
(they are pointing the same direction). In incongruent trials, they 
indicate the opposite directions and flankers activate wrong automatic 
response that is to be ignored and inhibited.
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informed that they were free to withdraw from the study at 
any point.
A total of 124 participants (85 females, Mage = 22.61, 
SD = 2.51, range 19–37 years) were recruited and randomly 
assigned to the three experimental conditions: the control, 
the depleted inhibition and the intact inhibition conditions. 
Participants were tested in groups of two to eleven in a labo-
ratory with separate computer stations.
Nine participants guessed the true purpose of the study, 
and their results were excluded from the analysis concerning 
the frequency of involuntary task-unrelated thoughts, includ-
ing IFTs and IAMs. Due to technical difficulties, one addi-
tional participant did not finish the experiment. Therefore, 
the final sample consisted of 114 participants with 38 par-
ticipants in the control condition (27 females, Mage = 22.95, 
SD = 2.91, range 20–37 years), 38 participants in the intact 
inhibition condition (25 females, Mage = 22.25, SD = 1.85, 
range 19–28 years) and 38 participants in the depleted inhi-
bition condition (25 females, Mage = 22.20, SD = 1.63, range 
19–25 years). Students participated in return for a 50 PLN 
(ca. 14 USD).
Materials
The vigilance task
In the present study, we used a fully computerized version 
of the vigilance task described elsewhere in more detail 
(e.g., Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, pp. 5–6; also; 
Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016, p. 524), which was very 
similar to the procedure used by Plimpton et al. (2015) to 
study IAMs and IFTs under laboratory conditions (adapted 
from Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). The main differ-
ences between the present task and Plimpton et al.’s (2015) 
design were as follows: (1) using 400 slides instead of 600, 
(2) random presentation of trials for each participant, (3) 
extending the presentation of each trial from 1.5 to 2.5 s,3 
(4) providing participants with 12 fixed stops with thought 
probes, and (5) participants typing their answers to thought 
questionnaires.
The vigilance task involved detecting patterns of verti-
cal lines (eight target slides) in a stream of 392 non-target 
slides with horizontal lines. Slides were presented for 2.5 s 
with short verbal phrases (e.g., driving a car, swimming in 
the sea) displayed in the centre of each slide. There were 
approximately equal numbers of neutral (N = 134), positive 
(N = 133), and negative (N = 133) phrases, that constituted 
the final pool of 400 phrases, which were randomly selected 
from the pool of 800 phrases used in previous studies (e.g., 
Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, 2018a; Barzykowski 
& Staugaard, 2016, 2018).4 While the random selection of 
word phrases from the pool was exactly the same for all 
participants, the order was randomized for each participant. 
The program stopped automatically at 12 fixed points during 
the presentation with the following message appearing on 
the screen “Please stop and record your concentration and 
thoughts now”. Participants provided a brief description of 
the content of their thoughts (by typing it into the computer 
program), indicated how much they were concentrating on 
the task when stopped (1 = Not at all; 7 = Fully concentrat-
ing) and if the thought occurred deliberately (they decided 
to think about it) or involuntarily (it simply popped in their 
mind). The probes, which were modelled on previous lit-
erature (Plimpton et al., 2015), were presented in a fixed 
pseudo-random order and occurred at varying intervals con-
sisting of a minimum of 22 (about 55 s) and a maximum of 
42 (about 105 s) slides. Importantly, these intervals between 
the stops were comparable to those reported by Plimpton 
et al. (2015), which varied between 52.5 and 105 s.
Experimental manipulation of inhibitory resources (the 
Stroop task)
Two versions of the Stroop-like task were used to manipulate 
the availability of resources for cognitive inhibition before 
starting the vigilance task (MacLeod, 1991; Chuderski, 
Taraday, Nęcka, & Smoleń, 2012). This task consisted of 
four colour words (red, green, blue, and yellow) in Polish, 
printed in one of these four colours (e.g., the word red could 
be printed in red, green, blue or yellow colours). Participants 
were instructed to judge the colour of the ink of the word as 
fast as possible, without paying attention to the meaning of 
the word, by pressing a key corresponding to the colour of 
the ink. Each word was displayed for 2000 ms with 150 ms 
interval between trials and a 1000 ms feedback screen after 
each trial. While the meaning of the word and the colour 
of the ink were the same in congruent trials, the meaning 
differed from the colour of the ink in incongruent trials. 
In the inhibition depletion condition, 75% of trials were 
incongruent. In the intact inhibition condition, 100% of trials 
were congruent. Both of these tasks lasted 60 min and were 
presented on a computer using E-prime 2 (PST, Pittsburgh, 
USA). Finally, for a practice trial, we used a short 2-min 
version of the Stroop task that consisted of 50% congruent 
and 50% incongruent trials.
3 The presentation time of each trial was increased to keep the mean 
interval between the thought probes (83  s) comparable to the mean 
interval in the Plimpton et al. (2015) study (81 s), who used the larger 
number of trials (600 instead of 400).
4 The Polish adaptation of verbal phrases is described in detail else-
where (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, p. 6). Briefly, they were 
rated by 12 independent coders as positive, neutral and negative.
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Manipulation checks for depleting inhibitory resources (the 
Simon task)
We used the Simon task (Simon, 1990) to assess the 
impact of manipulating inhibitory control resources by 
measuring the inhibition performance before and after the 
extended completion of the Stroop-like task. The Simon 
task consists of a yellow or pink circle appearing either on 
the left or on the right side of the screen. Participants were 
instructed to respond as fast as possible by pressing a left 
(S) or right (L) key of the keyboard with the left or right 
index finger according to the colour of the stimulus (left-
pink; right-yellow). Each stimuli appeared after a fixation 
cross presented at the centre of the screen for 200 ms. 
In congruent trials, the spatial location of the stimulus 
and response were the same (e.g., right stimulus/right 
response). In the incongruent trials, the spatial location of 
the stimulus was opposite to the location of the response 
(e.g., right stimulus/left response), which triggered an 
automatic response that had to be inhibited. The Simon 
task consisted of 160 trials with 600 ms intervals between 
each trial. At the completion of the task, participants were 
provided with feedback about their performance (mean 
reaction time and percent of correct responses). The task 
lasted about 2–3 min and was presented on a computer 
using E-prime (PST, Pittsburgh, USA).
The positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; 
Brzozowski, 2010)
This scale measures the strength of negative and positive 
emotions and consists of 30 items measuring current emo-
tional states. Participants have to rate on a five-point scale 
to what extent the given adjectives correspond with their 
current state. The reliability coefficients (internal consist-
ency and stability) of the Polish version of the PANAS 
range from 0.73 to 0.95 (Brzozowski, 2010). It was used 
to control for possible differences between the conditions. 
For example, it was possible that performing a high-
conflict task (i.e., incongruent version of the Stroop task) 
would negatively affect participants’ mood.
Procedure
The control participants did not perform the Stroop task 
before the vigilance task, while participants in the other 
two conditions performed the incongruent and congruent 
versions of the Stroop task, respectively, before complet-
ing the vigilance task. An overview of the procedure is 
presented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1  An overview of the experimental procedure. While depleted and intact inhibition conditions followed all steps, the control group per-
formed only the vigilance task and completed the PANAS and additional control questions before and after the vigilance task
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Control condition
At the beginning, participants completed a questionnaire 
about the activities they were involved in before the exper-
imental session and their current levels of fatigue. Using 
seven-point scales, participants rated the extent to which 
previously performed activities were tiring, difficult, how 
much concentration they required and the extent to which 
participants had been performing them as well as they could. 
Participants also rated their current level of general, physi-
cal and mental fatigue (on all scales, one corresponded to 
not endorsing the item at all, four corresponded to average 
endorsement, and seven corresponded to highly endorsing 
the item). All points along the scale were clearly labelled.
Then, participants were verbally informed that the experi-
ment examined how people concentrated on monotonous and 
boring tasks. The experimenter only briefly introduced the 
participants to the procedure by providing verbal instructions 
about how to complete the vigilance task. Next, participants 
started the computerized vigilance task, which provided 
them with more detailed written instructions. In particular, 
as in previous studies (e.g., Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 
2016, 2018a, 2018b; Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016, 2018; 
Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti, & Maz-
zoni, 2014, 2015), participants were instructed to identify 
slides with vertical lines by pressing a red button (“m” on 
the keyboard). In addition, they were informed that they 
would also see word phrases in the centre of each slide. It 
was explained that these word phrases were used in another 
condition and they should not respond to them during the 
current study. Next, participants were engaged in the first 
practice session that required responding only to target slides 
with vertical lines. It lasted about one minute and consisted 
of 25 non-target and 2 target stimuli, with no stop trials.
After the first practice task, participants were informed 
that during the vigilance task they might experience dif-
ferent kinds of task-unrelated thoughts, and they were pro-
vided with examples of such thoughts, including personal 
goals, words, random associations, current concerns, future 
thoughts, plans, and memories. However, no particular 
emphasis was put on memories and future-oriented thoughts 
during the briefing. Participants were only informed that 
thoughts could be diverse (i.e., specific, general) and pertain 
either to the present, past or future. Importantly, they were 
assured that these thoughts could be about anything and that 
they could simply pop into their mind spontaneously or they 
could have chosen to deliberately think about them. It was 
explained, that since the study was about people’s attention 
and concentration, the program would occasionally stop, 
and they would be asked to record their concentration level 
and the content of their thoughts at the exact moment they 
were stopped. Importantly, participants were encouraged to 
record the content of their thoughts at the exact moment 
they were stopped, regardless of what it was. They were 
also assured that their responses would be anonymous, and 
informed that they could refrain from reporting particularly 
sensitive thoughts by typing “X” as an answer, or (if pos-
sible) by providing a general description of their thoughts 
rather than a detailed account (see Appendix for the exact 
written instructions provided to participants).
Next, participants performed the second practice task that 
was the same as the first one with the addition of one stop 
trial.5 Once the practice task was completed, participants 
filled in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Brzozowski, 2010), and then started the main vigilance task. 
Each time the program stopped, they were asked to provide a 
brief description of the content of their thoughts (by typing it 
into the computer program), rate their level of concentration 
(on a seven-point scale) and indicate if the thought occurred 
deliberately (they decided to think about it) or involuntarily 
(it simply popped into their mind).
After completing the vigilance task, participants 
answered open-ended questions about what they thought the 
true goal of the study was. They were then provided briefly 
with verbal instructions describing the nature of autobio-
graphical memory (as, for example, in Schlagman, Kliegel, 
Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009, p. 410) and future thoughts 
and were informed about the second part of the study. Dur-
ing this part, the program provided participants with more 
detailed written instructions. Participants reviewed all of 
their thoughts recorded during the vigilance task, one at a 
time and in the same order as they had been recorded. Partic-
ipants were instructed to decide whether each thought was an 
autobiographical memory, future-oriented thought, thought 
relating to the current situation or other type of thought by 
clicking the appropriately labelled button. Choosing the last 
two options displayed the next recorded thoughts. If partici-
pants chose one of the first two options, they were asked to 
describe the memory or future-oriented thought more thor-
oughly by typing it into the computer program. This way we 
obtained longer descriptions of these mental contents than 
during the vigilance task.
Depleted inhibition condition (the incongruent version 
of the Stroop task)
The only difference between the control and the depleted 
inhibition condition was that before the vigilance task par-
ticipants performed an incongruent version of the Stroop 
task. As in the control condition, participants were informed 
5 By employing two practice sessions, we were able to sequentially 
provide participants with crucial elements of the procedure (i.e., 
instructions for the vigilance task only, followed by instructions how 
to record involuntary thoughts during the thought probes).
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that the experimental session examined how people concen-
trated on monotonous and boring tasks. It was explained 
that for this reason they would do a few vigilance tasks. 
While we did not explain in more detail the Simon task and 
Stroop-like task saying that detailed instructions would be 
provided in the program, we explained in more detail the 
vigilance task the same way as in the control conditions. 
Then, participants started with the first Simon task (pre-test) 
that allowed us to evaluate baseline inhibition performance. 
As in the Radel et al.’s (2015) study, to get a stable and 
coherent indicator of the individual’s inhibitory control, each 
participant did the task at least four times. If their responses 
in the fourth task were stabilized (accuracy and RT below 
5% of variation), sufficiently fast (average RT below 700 ms) 
and accurate (above 80% of correct responses), the training 
stopped at this point, indicating that there was no further 
effect of learning on the task and results mainly depended 
on the inhibitory control. Otherwise, participants had to 
complete additional runs of the task until they met these 
criteria. Next, participants trained on the short version of 
the Stroop task for about 2 min and then started the 60-min 
version of the incongruent Stroop task. Immediately after 
the Stroop task, participants completed the second Simon 
task (post-test) which was performed only once for about 
2–3 min, which allowed us to estimate the alteration of the 
inhibition capacity induced by the prolonged exposure to the 
congruent Stoop like task. Finally, just before starting the 
computer program with the vigilance task, participants filled 
in the PANAS and answered control questions concerning 
the activities they were just involved in and their current 
level of fatigue, which took no longer than 5 min.
Intact inhibition condition (the congruent version 
of the Stroop task)
The only difference between the depleted inhibition condi-
tion group and the intact inhibition condition was that par-
ticipants performed the low-conflict version of the Stroop 
task with 100% of congruent trials (i.e., 0% of incongruent 
trials).
Results
For all statistical analyses reported below, the level of sig-
nificance was set at p < .05, and the effect size was measured 
by partial eta-squared (ηp2).
Equivalence of experimental conditions 
before and after the vigilance task
To test the comparability of conditions before and after the 
vigilance task in terms of participants’ mood ratings, the 
overall mean positive and negative PANAS scores were 
entered into two separate 3 condition (control, depleted 
inhibition, intact inhibition) × 2 time of testing (before vs. 
after the vigilance task) mixed ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the last factor. The analysis on the mean 
positive affect scores revealed a significant main effect of 
time of testing, F(1, 119) = 29.70, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.20, 
with scores being significantly lower after completing 
the vigilance task (see Table 1). While the group by time 
interaction was not significant (F < 1), the main effect of 
group was approaching significance, F(1, 119) = 3.06, 
p = 0.050, ηp2 = 0.05, with higher scores in the control 
group compared to the intact and depleted inhibition con-
ditions (p = 0.015), which did not differ from each other 
(p = 0.258). For negative affect scores, none of the main or 
interaction effects were significant (all Fs < 1).
Table 1 also shows mean ratings of various cognitive 
and non-cognitive variables provided by participants 
either before or after completing the vigilance task. A 
series of one-way ANOVAs on these means with the 
condition (control, depleted inhibition, intact inhibition) 
as a between-subjects variable, resulted in statistically 
significant main effects for all the variables concerning 
the activity or tasks performed before the vigilance task 
(in the intact and depleted inhibition conditions the rat-
ings were made for the Stroop task). Specifically, signifi-
cant main effects emerged for how tired participants felt 
[F(2, 116) = 106.53, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.65], how difficult 
the tasks were [F(2, 116) = 17.08, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.23], 
levels of concentration [F(2, 116) = 26.89, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.32], general motivation to perform the tasks well 
[F(2, 116) = 24.09, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.29], general fatigue 
[F(2, 116) = 55.37, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.49], mental fatigue 
[F(2, 116) = 36.62, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.39], and physical 
fatigue [F(2, 116) = 3.71, p = 0.027, ηp2 = 0.06].
Post hoc tests indicated that participants in the control 
condition rated the activities performed before the vigilance 
task as less tiring, less difficult and requiring less concen-
tration than participants in the depleted and intact inhibi-
tion conditions (all p < 0.001). In addition, they were less 
motivated to perform these activities as well as possible, 
compared to other two experimental conditions, and they 
were reporting lower levels of general fatigue, and psycho-
logical fatigue before commencing the vigilance task (all 
p < 0.001). Participants in the control condition were less 
physically tired only compared to the intact inhibition con-
dition (p = 0.008). No statistically significant differences 
(all p > 0.06) were obtained between the depleted and intact 
inhibition conditions, which means that any differences in 
the number of involuntary memories and future thoughts 
between these conditions should not be due to differences in 
any of the variables listed above. Finally, a one-way ANOVA 
on ratings of how tiring participants found the vigilance task, 
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did not result in a significant main effect of condition [F(2, 
116) = 2.83, p = 0.063, ηp2 = 0.05).
Manipulation checks (the Simon task)
The performance on the Simon task was analyzed to exam-
ine if our experimental manipulation to deplete inhibitory 
control in the depleted inhibition condition by the incongru-
ous Stroop task was successful. Response times of correct 
responses (RT) and accuracy (ACC, percentage of correct 
responses) were obtained after excluding the first trial of 
each Simon task, because these trials could be affected 
by participants’ initial position adjustments. In addition, 
abnormally short (below 100 ms) and long (above 1300 ms) 
responses that typically correspond to anticipations and 
unattended responses were excluded.6 Descriptive statis-
tics for response times and accuracy scores are presented 
in Table 2 .
Mean response times were entered into a two times 
(before vs. after the Stroop task) x type of trials in the 
Simon task (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subject 
factors and the condition (depleted vs. intact inhibition) 
as a between-subjects factor. A significant main effect of 
the time of measurement was found indicating longer RT 
after (M = 474 ms, SE = 6 ms) than before (M = 461 ms, 
SE = 5 ms) the Stroop task, F(1, 80) = 12.16, p = 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.13. A significant effect of congruence was also 
found indicating longer RT for incongruent (M = 478 ms, 
SE = 5 ms) than congruent (M = 457 ms, SE = 5 ms) trials, 
F(1,80) = 111.45, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.58. None of the two-way 
Table 1  Means and standard 
deviations for variables 
measuring mood, fatigue, 
type of activities performed 
before the vigilance task, and 
performance on vigilance 
task as a function of condition 
(control, intact inhibition, 
depleted inhibition)
All questions but PANAS were rated on 7-point scales (1 = low to 7 = high). Means with the same numeri-
cal subscripts (e.g., 1, 2) are significantly different between columns. Please note that, while Stroop task 
in the intact inhibition condition consisted only of congruent trials, in the depleted inhibition condition it 
consisted of 75% of incongruent trials
Condition
Control Intact inhibition 
(congruent Stroop 
task)
Depleted inhibi-
tion (incongruent 
Stroop task)
M SD M SD M SD
Mood ratings
 PANAS: Positive affect_1 43.88 9.24 37.46 10.74 39.63 9.99
 PANAS: Positive affect_2 36.66 10.00 32.73 11.87 35.35 13.33
 PANAS: Negative affect_1 20.07 6.84 19.02 5.86 18.93 5.92
 PANAS: Negative affect_2 18.98 7.26 19.32 6.31 18.30 5.98
Activities before the vigilance task
 Tiring 2.831, 2 1.38 5.951 1.00 6.032 0.92
 Difficult 2.231, 2 1.05 3.381 1.41 3.982 1.58
 Concentration 3.821, 2 1.38 5.361 1.25 5.782 1.12
 General motivation to perform these 
activities well
4.981, 2 1.33 6.311 0.73 6.252 0.71
 General fatigue 2.631, 2 1.43 5.181 1.21 5.402 1.28
 Physical fatigue 3.151 1.51 4.081 1.55 3.53 1.50
 Mental fatigue 2.901, 2 1.19 5.031 1.18 4.982 1.40
After the vigilance task
 How tiring was the vigilance task 3.25 1.39 3.64 1.69 4.13 1.83
Performance on vigilance task
 Proportion of targets detected 0.93 0.14 0.88 0.18 0.89 0.15
 Response time (in seconds) 0.771, 2 0.16 0.951 0.26 0.902 0.22
 Concentration rating 4.621, 2 1.09 3.371 1.26 3.592 1.02
6 According to Whelan (2008), very slow reaction times, due to the 
subject’s inattention, can strongly influence the outcome of hypoth-
esis tests, and should be excluded from the analyses. Ratcliff (1993) 
argues that, eliminating response times above an absolute cutoff point 
is the most appropriate method for maintaining the highest power. In 
our study, the cutoff points of 100 and 1300 ms were chosen accord-
ing to the outlier labelling rule by Hoaglin, Iglewitz and Tuckey 
(1986). Specifically, the response times that were 2.2 times “the inter-
quartile range below the bottom or above the upper quartile value of the distribution” (Marwerde 2017, p.  135) were treated as outliers 
(Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987).
Footnote 6 (continued)
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interactions were significant (Fs < 1). Critically, however, 
a three-way interaction between the time of measurement, 
type of trial in the Simon task, and the condition was found, 
F(1,80) = 4.85, p = 0.031, ηp2 = 0.06.
This effect can be best teased apart by examining the 
standard measure of the Simon effect, i.e., the difference 
between the mean response times of incongruent and con-
gruent trials, which represents the time needed to inhibit 
the interference (Simon, 1990). A mixed two (condition) by 
two (time of measurement) ANOVA on these response time 
difference scores resulted in a significant interaction between 
these variables, F(1, 80) = 4.85, p = 0.031, ηp2 = 0.06, indi-
cating that while participants in the intact inhibition con-
dition took a similar amount of time to inhibit the inter-
ference before and after the Stroop task (t(40) = 0.982, 
p = 0.332), participants in the depleted inhibition condition 
were slower to exert inhibition after than before the Stroop 
task (t(40) = 2.081, p = 0.044) (see Fig. 2). This effect can-
not be explained by a pre-existing group difference because 
no between-group difference was present at baseline, [F(1, 
80) = 1.81, p = 0.182, ηp2 = 0.02]. Similarly, no differences 
between the groups were present at baseline in response 
times to congruent and incongruent trials separately, 
F(1, 80) = 1.58, p = 0.212, ηp2 = 0.02 and F(1, 80) = 0.41, 
p = 0.53, ηp2 = 0.005, respectively.
The two (condition) by two (trial congruence) by two 
(time of measurement) mixed ANOVA on accuracy scores 
resulted only in significant main effects of time of meas-
urement (F(1,80) = 7.23, p = 0.009, ηp2 = 0.08), and congru-
ence (F(1,80) = 49.296, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.38), with more 
correct responses after (M = 93.4%, SE = 0.5%) than before 
(M = 91.9%, SE = 0.7%) the Stroop task, and less correct 
responses for the incongruent (M = 91.0, SE = 0.7%) than 
congruent trials (M = 94.3, SE = 0.4%). Because no main 
effect of condition or interaction effects were significant 
(ps > 0.095), the differences found between the two condi-
tions in terms of response times in the previous analysis can-
not likely be explained in terms of a possible change in the 
speed–accuracy trade-off. To completely rule out this pos-
sibility, a composite index (also called throughput rate) was 
created by calculating the ratio of accuracy over time (RT/
accuracy ratio), representing the processing efficiency (Salt-
house & Hedden, 2010). This composite index was entered 
into a mixed two (condition) by two (trial congruence) by 
two (time of measurement) ANOVA, which also revealed 
no main or interaction effect of the condition on processing 
efficiency (ps > 0.116).
In sum, this pattern of findings suggests that the manipu-
lation of levels of inhibition in the Stroop task was effective 
in depleting inhibitory resources in participants who per-
formed the incongruent Stroop task, but not in participants 
who performed the congruent Stroop task (i.e., depleted and 
intact inhibition conditions, respectively).
Performance on the vigilance task
All participants successfully completed the vigilance task. 
The results are presented in Table 1. While there were no 
significant differences between the conditions in terms of the 
proportion of targets detected [F(2, 111) = 0.97, p = 0.384, 
ηp2 = 0.02], there were significant main effects for response 
Table 2  Means and standard 
deviations for reaction times and 
accuracy measured in Simon 
task before and after prolonged 
exposure to incongruent Stroop 
task (depleted inhibition 
condition) and congruent Stroop 
task (intact inhibition condition)
Time of meas-
urement
Condition Congruence Mean SD Mean SD
Before Depleted inhibition Congruent trials 458 132 94.8 22.3
Incongruent trials 476 122 91.2 28.3
Intact inhibition Congruent trials 446 106 94.9 22.0
Incongruent trials 469 107 92.8 25.9
After Depleted inhibition Congruent trials 465 133 92.6 26.2
Incongruent trials 489 139 88.8 31.6
Intact inhibition Congruent trials 461 117 95.2 21.3
Incongruent trials 483 114 91.7 27.5
Fig. 2  The mean reaction times in Simon task before and after pro-
longed exposure on the incongruent Stroop task (depleted inhibition 
condition) and congruent Stroop task (intact inhibition). The Simon 
effect scores were calculated as subtracting RTs on congruent trials 
from RTs on incongruent trials. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals for the comparison groups
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times to targets [F(2, 109) = 6.22, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.10] 
and levels of concentration reported [F(2, 111) = 13.32, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.19]. Specifically, participants in the control 
condition were faster at responding to targets than partici-
pants in the intact and depleted conditions (p = 0.001 and 
p = 0.013, respectively), and reported higher levels of con-
centration on the vigilance task than participants in the two 
other conditions (p < 0.001 for both conditions), which did 
not differ from each other on these variables (F < 1).
Frequency and type of recorded thoughts
Given that each participant was stopped 12 times during 
the vigilance task, the total number of thought probes was 
456 (12 × 38) in each condition. On 22 occasions (3 in the 
control, 14 in the depleted and 5 in the intact inhibition con-
ditions), participants gave “X” as an answer. In addition, on 
3 occasions (1 in each condition), they indicated that their 
mind was blank at the time of being stopped. This resulted 
in 452, 441, and 450 valid thought probes in the control, 
depleted and intact inhibition conditions, respectively.
Initially, all recorded thoughts were independently coded 
by the first author and a research assistant as either task-
related or task-unrelated (cf. Plimpton et al. ,2015; Small-
wood et al., 2003; Smallwood, Obonsawin, and Reid, 2003). 
Out of all valid 1343 thoughts, 1074 (80%) were task-unre-
lated thoughts (e.g., meeting with my sister yesterday, going 
to the cinema after studying), while 269 (20%) were classed 
as task-related thoughts (this is so boring, don’t forget to 
push the button) and were removed from further analysis. 
The agreement between the raters was 84%. Disagreements 
were solved by discussion. Second, out of 1074 task-unre-
lated thoughts, 188 (17.5%) were classed by participants as 
occurring deliberately rather than involuntarily. Since task-
unrelated deliberate thoughts were not the primary focus of 
the present study (i.e., their occurrence would not depend on 
the depletion of a special inhibitory mechanism designed to 
keep involuntary thoughts at bay), they were excluded from 
further analyses, resulting in 886 spontaneous task-unrelated 
thoughts.
To examine the possible effects of depleting inhibitory 
control before the vigilance task on the number of involun-
tary task-unrelated thoughts reported during the vigilance 
task, the numbers of these thoughts in the control, depleted 
and intact inhibition conditions were entered into a one-way 
ANOVA with the condition as a between-subjects variable 
(see Table 3). The main effect of condition was not signifi-
cant (F(2, 111) = 0.09, p = 0.914, ηp2 = 0.01), indicating that 
spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts were reported with 
similar frequency across the three conditions.
Temporal focus of thoughts
After completing the vigilance task, participants were asked 
to decide whether each thought they reported was a memory 
of a past event, a future-oriented thought or something else.7 
To ensure the thoughts had been categorized correctly, all 
the entries were also screened by the first author and the 
research assistant. All entries identified by participants as 
memories and future-oriented thoughts were in line with 
judgements by the judges. However, some of the thoughts 
classed as autobiographical memories or future thoughts by 
the judges were not identified as such by participants.8 Re-
evaluated entries (e.g., the first time I went to Netherlands, 
having a meeting tomorrow morning) only with an agree-
ment of 100% between judges were included in the analysis.9
Since the main focus of the present paper was on IFTs and 
IAMs, they were entered into a 3 condition (control, depleted 
inhibition, intact inhibition) × 2 temporal focus (past, future) 
Table 3  Mean numbers (and 
standard deviations) of different 
types of involuntary task-
unrelated thoughts as a function 
of condition (control, intact 
inhibition, depleted inhibition)
Condition
Control Intact inhibition Intact inhibi-
tion
M SD M SD M SD
Total number of involuntary task-unrelated thoughts 7.82 2.60 7.87 3.02 7.63 1.95
Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) 1.87 1.53 1.34 1.44 1.24 1.26
Involuntary future thoughts (IFTs) 1.63 1.40 1.29 1.18 1.71 1.80
Involuntary present-oriented thoughts 2.50 2.10 3.13 1.89 2.89 2.05
Involuntary atemporal thoughts 1.16 1.31 1.24 1.44 1.05 1.18
7 This category included thoughts classed as present thoughts (I have 
dry eyes, I am hungry) and atemporal thoughts (Hegel was an awe-
some philosopher).
8 As pointed out by Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska (2018a, p. 123), 
due to the automated nature of the task, the decision whether a men-
tal content was or was not a memory was irreversible, and this could 
have resulted in some errors that the participants committed in the 
categorization task.
9 In total, there were 170 entries re-evaluated from which 73% were 
included in the analysis and 27% were inconclusive. In total, the re-
evaluated entries constituted 19% of entries included into the analysis.
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mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor (for 
means see Table 3). Neither the main effects of condition 
[F(2, 111) = 1.79, p = 0.172, ηp2 = 0.03], the temporal focus 
of thought [F(1, 111) = 0.10, p = 0.752, ηp2 = 0.01], nor the 
condition by temporal focus interaction [F(2, 111) = 1.20, 
p = 0.304, ηp2 = 0.02], were significant.10 For the sake of 
completeness, we repeated the above analysis by including 
the numbers of present-oriented and atemporal thoughts into 
a 3 (condition) by 4 (temporal focus) mixed ANOVA. Nei-
ther the main effect of condition or the condition by tempo-
ral focus interaction were significant (Fs < 1.31, ps > 0.253). 
However, there was a significant main effect of the temporal 
focus of thought [F(3, 333) = 24.193, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.18], 
showing the highest number of present-oriented thoughts 
compared to the other types of thoughts (see Table 3).
To evaluate the possibility that the depletion manipulation 
did not last throughout the entire vigilance task, and had an 
effect on the number of spontaneous thoughts only during 
the first half of the vigilance task, we repeated the above 
analysis by including the additional within-subjects vari-
able of the vigilance task phase (1st half, 2nd half). How-
ever, the 3 condition (control, intact, depleted) x 2 temporal 
focus (past, future) x vigilance task (1st half, 2nd half) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors did 
not result in any effects of condition, either alone or in inter-
action with vigilance task phase, all p > 0.13. Furthermore, 
we repeated this analysis including past and future thoughts 
from only the first four and last four thought probes in the 
vigilance task. Again, no significant effects were obtained, 
all p > 0.179. In summary, the results of these additional 
analyses suggest that the effect of depletion manipulation (or 
rather, its absence) was stable across the time, and compara-
ble both at the beginning and at the end of the vigilance task.
Correlations between ratings of fatigue 
and task‑unrelated involuntary thoughts
Some previous studies have reported positive associations 
between increased cognitive fatigue and levels of mind-wan-
dering (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010; Zhang & Kumada 
,2017). To investigate this relationship in our sample, we cal-
culated correlations between the ratings of perceived fatigue 
(i.e., general, physical and mental tiredness) and the num-
ber of IFTs, IAMs, present-oriented and atemporal thoughts. 
Given that the three conditions did not differ in the number 
of these thoughts, the correlations were calculated on the 
data pooled across the three conditions. None of the corre-
lations between the different ratings of fatigue and types of 
thoughts reported were significant (all p > 0.309).
Discussion
We investigated the role of cognitive inhibition on the 
frequency of IFTs and IAMs. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the depleted inhibition, intact inhibition and the 
control conditions. By having participants in the depleted 
and intact inhibition conditions perform incongruent and 
congruent Stroop tasks, respectively, before completing the 
vigilance task, we were able to manipulate the level of avail-
able cognitive inhibition resources in these two conditions. 
In addition, we made every attempt to keep the conditions 
comparable in terms of several other background variables 
(cognitive and emotional). In line with the cognitive inhibi-
tion dependency hypothesis, it was predicted that the fre-
quency of IAMs and IFTs would increase in the depleted 
inhibition condition in comparison to the intact inhibition 
and the control conditions. However, in contrast to the pre-
diction, the number of IFTs and IAMs did not differ across 
the experimental and control conditions during the subse-
quent vigilance task. To evaluate the possibility that the 
depleted inhibition affected the number of IFTs and IAMs 
only at the earlier phases of the vigilance task, the addi-
tional analyses were conducted on the number of involuntary 
thoughts in the first half and the first third of the vigilance 
task, but they also resulted in non-significant findings.
Another interesting and novel finding that emerged from 
our study, concerns possible effects of fatigue on the number 
of reported IAMs and IFTs. Thus, participants in the intact 
inhibition condition reported significantly higher levels of 
general, physical and mental fatigue than participants in the 
control condition. These increased levels of self-reported 
fatigue resulted from the prolonged performance of the con-
gruent Stroop task that required sustained cognitive effort, 
and was reflected in actual performance decrements in the 
vigilance task in terms of increased response time to the tar-
get stimuli (see Table 1). The fact that the response times in 
the vigilance task were shorter in the control condition com-
pared to other two experimental conditions lends additional 
support to the notion that attentional resources were indeed 
reduced in these ‘fatiguing’ conditions. Despite these differ-
ences in self-reported fatigue, participants in the control and 
intact inhibition conditions did not differ in the number of 
reported IFTs and IAMs. In addition, correlations between 
the ratings of fatigue and the number of reported IFTs and 
10 Although it may be argued that the nature of the data may require 
statistical analysis basing on a Poisson rather than Gaussian distribu-
tion (as it is recommended for count-valued data; e.g., Inouye, Yang, 
Allen, & Ravikumar, 2017), we used the ANOVA model which is 
rather robust to violations of normality (Field, 2009). However, this 
main analysis was repeated using the generalized estimating equa-
tions (GEE) basing on a Poisson distribution. The GEE model dem-
onstrated similar results to the ANOVA model; namely, neither the 
main effects of condition (χ²(2) = 3.67, p = .16), the temporal focus 
of thought (χ²(1) = 0.15, p = .70), nor the condition by temporal focus 
interaction (χ²(2) = 2.13, p = .34), were significant.
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IAMs in the entire sample were not significant. Below, we 
will first discuss the implications that these findings have for 
our understanding of the nature and underlying mechanisms 
of IAMs and IFTs, followed by a discussion of possible limi-
tations and future avenues for research.
Theoretical implications
Given that IFTs and IAMs are predominantly triggered by 
easily identifiable triggers, and the ubiquity of such trig-
gers, the important theoretical question in the literature 
concerns the underlying mechanisms of such involuntary 
episodic MTT and why we are not constantly flooded by 
IAMs and IFTs in daily life. According to the influential 
model of autobiographical memory by Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce (2000), autobiographical memories (and by exten-
sion, thoughts about possible future events) are constantly 
activated by incidental external and internal triggers, but 
the inhibitory control mechanism keeps suppressing these 
task-irrelevant thoughts, preventing them from reaching con-
sciousness. In the present study, we investigated the exist-
ence of this hypothetical inhibitory mechanism using a well-
established paradigm of depleting inhibitory control (Radel 
et al., 2015; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Hagger, Wood, 
Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010), and assessing the number of 
IFTs and IAMs reported by participants after the depletion 
manipulation. The findings did not provide support for the 
existence of such a ubiquitous control mechanism.
One possible reason for this null effect is that the inhibi-
tory control mechanism switches on only when people are 
engaged in attentionally demanding activities (e.g., read-
ing, writing, having a conversation), because these are the 
activities that can be negatively affected by the occurrence 
of involuntary thoughts. If this is the case, the vigilance task 
used in the present study with its medium level of attentional 
demands (as reflected by mean ratings of concentration) 
would not be sensitive enough to examine the cognitive inhi-
bition dependency hypothesis. Future studies could manipu-
late the difficulty level of the vigilance task to assess the idea 
that the depletion manipulation will increase the IFTs and 
IAMs during the difficult, but not the standard version of 
the vigilance task. Initial support for this idea comes from a 
study by Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska (2018a), who found 
that the proportion of IAMs (out of all the spontaneous task-
unrelated thoughts reported) was higher in the attentionally 
highly demanding than in a standard vigilance task.
An alternative explanation is that the inhibitory control 
mechanism may not be necessary to keep the constantly acti-
vated involuntary episodic thoughts from coming to mind 
consciously. Indeed, our working memory has limited capac-
ity and, at any given time, our mind is occupied by thoughts 
(either task-related or task-unrelated), which may prevent 
other thoughts from coming to mind simply because there is 
no extra capacity to experience these thoughts (cf. Kvavilas-
hvili & Mandler, 2004). In other words, even if a particu-
lar IAM or IFT is ready to spring to one’s mind, if at that 
moment one’s mind is already attending to the environment 
or is engaged in other activities or thoughts, this may be suf-
ficient to prevent these involuntary thoughts coming to one’s 
mind. For example, in a recent laboratory study by Floridou, 
Willimson, & Stewart (2017), participants watched two brief 
non-dialogue film trailers with music and then spent 5 min 
either doing nothing (eyes closed) or making a mark on a 
paper when seeing a blue dot on the screen (occurring in 
predictable alternate order with a red dot). Participants were 
then probed for the types of thoughts they had during the 
previous 5 min including any involuntary musical imagery 
(the tunes that they just had heard popping to their mind). 
While 65% of participants in the no task condition reported 
having involuntary musical imagery, this dropped to 32.5% 
in the group who were simply monitoring the blue dot. This 
finding suggests that even relatively undemanding activities, 
such as attending to predictable stimuli in the external envi-
ronment, can substantially reduce the number of involuntary 
cognitions in one’s mind (for similar findings on IAMs, see 
Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski and Chiorri, 2018).
Another possible mechanism for why we are not flooded 
by IAMs and IFTs, proposed by Berntsen, Staugaard, and 
Sørensen (2013), refers to the cue overload. According to the 
cue overload principle, a particular cue may be associatively 
related to more than one past event (Berntsen, 2009). There-
fore, the more events are associated with a particular cue, 
the less efficient this cue will be in triggering any of them. 
In line with this, Berntsen et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
a particular sound was a less effective cue for triggering an 
involuntary memory of a visual scene if, at encoding, it was 
also associated to several other visual scenes. Because a lot 
of cues that we encounter on a daily basis (people, objects, 
places, sounds, etc.) are associatively linked to several or 
many possible past or future events, this may prevent us from 
being flooded by IAMs and IFTs as they are less likely to be 
formed in response to such cues. Taken together, it appears 
that several variables can influence the occurrence of IFTs 
and IAMs in addition to, or instead of, the putative inhibi-
tory control mechanism. The results of the present study 
are important, because they show that the role of the inhibi-
tory mechanism is perhaps not as strong as suggested by the 
inhibitory control dependency hypothesis.
Furthermore, findings in relation to mental and physical 
fatigue provide novel insights into the underlying mecha-
nisms of IAMs and IFTs. Given that mental fatigue has been 
shown to lead to sub-optimal performance and increased 
errors in tasks relying on executive control and strategic 
retrieval processes (e.g., Van der Linden, Frese, & Meij-
man, 2003; Lorist, 2008), our results provide further sup-
port to the idea that involuntary episodic past and future 
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thoughts are mediated by more automatic processes that do 
not require effortful retrieval or constructive processes (cf. 
Berntsen, 2010). This finding accords well with the results 
obtained by Cole et al. (2016) showing comparable and 
rapid retrieval latencies for both IFTs and IAMs in response 
to incidental cues on the screen. The findings are particu-
larly important for the newly emerging field of research on 
IFTs, as they suggest that significant differences may exist 
in involuntary and voluntary episodic future MTT. Although 
voluntary forms of episodic future simulations rely on con-
structive and effortful process, the present results provide 
new evidence that the occurrence of IFTs may be less reliant 
on such executive control processes (cf. Cole et al., 2016).
Possible limitations and future avenues for research
While our results suggest that the occurrence of IFTs and 
IAMs may not depend on inhibitory control, there is a ques-
tion whether any aspect of our procedure imposes constraints 
on this interpretation. First, it can be argued that the manip-
ulation used to deplete cognitive inhibition resources was 
inefficient, which would explain a lack of expected differ-
ences between the conditions in the number of involuntary 
mental contents. However, the majority of previous studies 
on the effects of depletion on self-control have used fairly 
brief depletion tasks (about 5–10 min) and have not verified 
the presence of depletion at the end of the manipulation with 
another task measuring inhibitory control (for meta-analysis, 
see Hagger et al., 2010). In the present study, we used an 
even stronger version of the depletion manipulation (i.e., 
longer and with higher proportion of incongruent trials) than 
the one that was successfully used by Radel et al. (2015) 
with a 40-min long depletion task and 50% incongruent 
trials. In addition, our manipulation successfully impaired 
inhibitory control in participants who performed the incon-
gruent Stroop Task, before they started the vigilance task. 
This should have resulted in differences between experimen-
tal conditions if inhibitory control played an important role 
in the occurrence of IFTs and IAMs.
Second, one may question whether the depletion of inhi-
bition, confirmed by the Simon task immediately after the 
Stroop task, lasted long enough to have noticeable effects 
on IAMs and IFTs during the subsequent vigilance task. In 
addition, there was up to an 8 min delay between the Simon 
task and the vigilance task, in which participants completed 
the PANAS and answered questions about fatigue, motiva-
tion and concentration. According to the strength model 
of self-control (Muraven& Baumeister, 2000), cognitive 
resources are limited and a period of rest should lead to 
the replenishment of the depleted resource. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, there has been very little research on 
the time needed to restore the depleted inhibitory control 
resources. For example, Tyler & Burns (2008) demonstrated 
that the depletion effect (resulting from a 6-min long men-
tal and physical exercise) on a subsequent self-control task 
(persistence on a handgrip squeeze test) was eliminated 
with a 10-min delay (filled with questionnaires) between 
the tasks, but not with a 1-min and 3-min delay intervals. 
However, Oaten, Williams, Jones and Zadro (2008), who 
used a different depletion manipulation (a 5-min computer 
game creating the impression of being socially ostracised), 
found that the negative effects of depletion (measured by 
the amount of food or drink consumed), were present even 
after a 45-min delay (filled with questionnaires). Moreover, a 
meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010) showed that depletion 
effects were stronger in studies that used delays filled with 
questionnaires and manipulation checks than in the studies 
without delays between a depletion and a subsequent self-
control task. Based on this evidence, we can be fairly certain 
that the depleted inhibitory control was not restored in our 
study by the time participants started the vigilance task.
It is also less likely that a full recovery of inhibitory 
resources occurred during the ongoing vigilance task. We 
addressed this issue by examining the number of IFTs and 
IAMs in the initial phases of the vigilance task, but they 
were not different from the numbers reported later in the 
task. Moreover, since the vigilance task induced boredom, 
and required medium to high levels of concentration and 
effort (see Table 3), it may be considered as a depleting task 
itself (Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008), which fur-
ther reduces the possibility that the resources depleted by a 
60-min incongruent Stroop task were fully restored during 
the vigilance task.
The third, and related, question concerns the domain gen-
erality/specificity of inhibitory and cognitive control, and the 
possible absence of transfer from one domain to another. In 
other words, it is possible that the reduction in the capac-
ity to exert inhibitory control in the context of the Stroop 
task did not affect the inhibitory mechanism involved in the 
occurrence of IFTs and IAMs. However, many studies using 
the sequential-tasks paradigm, have already shown that the 
performance on the first inhibitory control task, such as the 
Stroop task, can influence the performance in a variety of 
other subsequent tasks, such as the physical effort mainte-
nance (Pageaux, Lepers, Dietz, & Marcora, 2014) or deci-
sion making (Yam, Chen, & Reynolds, 2014). Importantly, 
the presence of such transfer effects from an initial inhibi-
tory control task to a subsequent task has been confirmed 
in a recent meta-analysis by Dang (2017), which showed 
significant depletion effects after performing the Stroop 
task with a moderate effect size (i.e., Hedge’s g = 0.44, 95% 
CI = 0.18–0.69). Consequently, if the occurrence of involun-
tary mental contents was limited by the inhibitory control, 
we should have been observed it in the present study.
Finally, we used the probe-caught method in which par-
ticipants were randomly stopped on 12 occasions during 
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the vigilance task and asked what was going through their 
mind at the exact moment they were stopped (see Plimpton 
et al., 2015). One could argue that the probe-caught method 
may not be as sensitive in detecting the effects of depleted 
inhibition as the self-caught method, in which participants 
stop themselves to report the occurrence of spontaneous 
thoughts (e.g., Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016, 2018; Bar-
zykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili, 2008; Cole et al., 2016; Vannucci et al., 
2014), because participants in the depleted inhibition con-
dition could have been experiencing increased frequency of 
IFTs and IAMs in time periods between the two consecutive 
stops. However, the probe-caught method was specifically 
chosen to obtain unbiased measures of the depletion effect, 
because in the self-caught method, the depleted resources 
could also negatively affect participants’ monitoring or 
meta-awareness for the occurrence of IFTs and IAMs (e.g., 
see Vannucci et al., 2018). In addition, our participants 
were stopped fairly frequently during the vigilance task (on 
average once every 83 s), and on the majority of the stops, 
they reported task-unrelated spontaneous thoughts. There-
fore, this should have given us a reasonably good chance of 
detecting effects of depletion if they were present.
Final conclusions and future directions
While we used a long and robust experimental manipula-
tion aimed at depleting the cognitive resources needed for 
inhibition, we were not able to observe a significant increase 
in the retrieval of involuntary mental contents in general, 
and IFTs and IAMs, in particular. Our findings demonstrate 
that the impaired inhibition may not affect the occurrence 
of such thoughts, and therefore, they do not support the idea 
that involuntary mental contents rely strongly on the spe-
cial inhibitory control mechanism. However, results of the 
present study raise interesting questions for future research 
about the underlying mechanisms of involuntary episodic 
MTT, by studying the role of inhibition in combination 
with other potentially important variables such as ongoing 
task difficulty and the nature of incidental triggers in the 
environment.
Another interesting avenue for research is to adopt an 
individual differences approach and pre-select participants 
based on their performance scores on several different con-
flict tasks requiring high levels of inhibitory control. It is 
possible that participants with high levels of inhibitory con-
trol report fewer IFTs and IAMs in the laboratory vigilance 
task used in the present study, than participants with low 
inhibitory control abilities. Alternatively, one could investi-
gate a clinical group of adults with impaired cognitive con-
trol. For example, low inhibition efficiency is a characteris-
tic symptom of ADHD (Barkley, 1997) and schizophrenia 
(Beech, Powell, McWilliam, & Claridge, 1989), and several 
studies on individuals diagnosed with ADHD (e.g., Seli 
et al. 2015; see also; Jonkman et al., 2017) and schizophrenia 
(e.g., Elua, Laws, & Kvavilashvili, 2015) have demonstrated 
elevated levels of spontaneous mind-wandering in these 
individuals. It is therefore highly likely that they may be also 
more susceptible to experiencing IFTs and IAMs compared 
to non-clinical populations. We are currently exploring some 
of these possibilities in follow-up studies, and believe that 
this research may ultimately provide interesting insights into 
cognitive mechanisms of involuntary episodic MTT.
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